America Untold:
Forgotten heroes, Forgotten Stories
Scarlet Ingstad
Christian, Independent Author, Historian
Christian, Independent Author, Historian
Welcome back to Revolutionary Voices, a series aimed at highlighting the lesser-known figures of the American Revolution era. This month, I introduce you to the man the British called a "pirate," and the Americans called a hero...the founder of the U.S. Navy: John Paul Jones. A Violent Beginning John Paul was born on July 6, 1747 in Scotland. At the age of 12, he began his career with the British merchant marine, going to sea for the very first time as a cabin boy. He later served as a first mate on slave ships, but quickly vacated that trade in disgust. In 1769 he was appointed to the rank of master. Four years later, John Paul stopped his crew’s attempted mutiny by killing the ring leader. His actions were deemed “unnecessarily cruel,” but he claimed that they were done in self-defense. Unfortunately for John Paul, the man he killed was not an average sailor, but rather a man born to a very influential family in Scotland. To avoid facing trial for his actions, he fled to the British colony of Virginia. The British deemed him a fugitive, so he added the surname “Jones” in an attempt to evade detection. A Revolutionary Restart When the American Revolution exploded in 1775, Jones journeyed to Philadelphia and joined the early-version of the Continental Navy, thanks to the endorsement of the American patriot Richard Henry Lee. Jones was initially commissioned as a lieutenant on the very first American battleship, a 24-gun frigate called Alfred. It was on this frigate that Jones had the honor of hoisting the very first U.S. ensign over a naval vessel, an act that played a major role in acquiring the title: “Father of the American Navy.” Jones quickly acquired the rank of captain in 1776 and then received command of the ship Providence. During Jones’ first voyage on the Providence, he destroyed British fisheries and managed to capture sixteen British vessels. Soon after, Jones sailed for France under orders to assist with the American cause however necessary. He was placed in command of the Ranger from 1777 through 1778, the first American naval vessel to be formally saluted by the French. Commanding this vessel, Jones operated primarily in British waters and conducted valiant and daring raids on the shores of England. Jones was honored for his exploits and given command of five French and American vessels in 1779. Jones led a small squadron onboard his new flagship, Bonhomme Richard to capture seven merchantmen off the coast of Scotland. On September 23, 1779, Jones led one of the bloodiest battles in naval history. Despite the fact his own ship caught fire and began to sink, Jones refused to acquiesce to the surrender demands. He allegedly shouted a statement to the enemy, a statement that would be associated with Jones long after his death: “I have not yet begun to fight!” Three hours later, the British surrendered and Jones took command of their frigate, Serapis. Legacy After the Revolution, many British publications portrayed Jones as a ruthless pirate, akin to Blackbeard himself, due to Jones’ ruthless and bloody attacks against their ships. However, on the American side, Jones was hailed as a hero. Thomas Jefferson even fondly referred to him as “little Jones” due to his smaller stature. Jones’ personality, coupled with his actions, quickly propelled him to the status of “American favorite.” In addition to his skills as a naval commander, Jones also wrote eloquent letters and poetry, and even spoke some French. In 1788, the Russian Empress Catherine the Great appointed Jones as rear admiral in the Russian Navy. Jones left this position in 1789 and decided to move to Paris, where he died just a couple years later. In 1905, his remains were found and removed from their burial place in Paris to the United States. Then, in 1913, American President Theodore Roosevelt reinterred Jones’ remains in a tomb at the Naval Academy in Annapolis, Maryland. In 1999, Jones was given an honorary pardon by the Port of Whitehaven for his raid on the town in 1778. Today, many statues and memorials to John Paul Jones are scattered about the country, especially in Maryland, Virginia, and D.C. A replica of the ship Providence is currently docked at Alexandria, Virginia’s waterfront and offers cruises and historical tours with a John Paul Jones reenactor. John Paul Jones’ successful campaigns during the American Revolution earned him the title “Father of the American Navy.” His personality, relentless courage, and fighting prowess helped to define what it means to be a sailor in the United States Navy today. Upcoming Heroes and Heroines:
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Welcome back to my 14-part series on the life of Banastre Tarleton during the American Revolution! If you missed earlier installments, click the links below and read those chapters first. 1. Meet the Tarleton Family 2. Road to Revolution 3. "I'll Cut off General Lee's Head!" 4. Theater in Theatre 5. Legion Rising 6. Equine Design 7. Jericho Chapter 8: Tarleton vs Tallmadge The summer campaign of 1779 officially began in May. Clinton ordered his troops to begin an offensive in the direction of the New York highlands, focused on controlling the Hudson River. The British were convinced that if they could gain control of the Hudson, they would be able to divide the colonies in two, splitting the rebels apart, and quickly end the rebellion. However, the plan was doomed to fail. The British did not possess the manpower needed to fulfill this grandiose scheme. Despite knowing this, Washington moved his troops to New York to thwart Clinton’s efforts. To Clinton’s great frustration, Washington pushed his troops into the mountains around West Point rather than facing Clinton’s men head-on. This created a stalemate in the war and Clinton initiated a series of raids in Westchester County, attempting to draw the Continentals out. The Neutral Ground in Northern New York held most of the leaders on both sides of the war’s attention and became the most-fought-over area throughout the entire Revolution. Clinton soon learned of American militiamen camping near Pound Ridge who were also harassing Loyalist farmers. They had been ordered by General Washington to block any British advances toward Connecticut, aggravating the British general. In retaliation, Clinton ordered that the legion be prepared “to march on the shortest notice.” He intended for the legion to capture Major Ebenezer Lockwood, commander of the local patriot militia. For this endeavor, Clinton selected Banastre Tarleton over the more-experienced John Graves Simcoe. He also selected specific troops from various regiments, creating a specialized unit and placing them under Tarleton’s command. Why was Banastre selected over Simcoe? It was likely due to Tarleton’s impressive performance during the Stockbridge massacre. Clinton may have desired to reward Tarleton by giving him command of his very first independent operation. The men under his command consisted of seventy of the 17th Light Dragoons, elements of the Queen’s Rangers, and Hessian jagers, 200 men in total. Tarleton’s instructions were to subdue the 2nd Light Dragoons who were under the temporary command of Major Benjamin Tallmadge, one of Washington’s rising stars. On the 28th of June, Tallmadge moved to Pound Ridge just shy of Connecticut. He considered Pound Ridge to be “pretty strong ground” despite his knowledge of nearby British cavalry. As head of intelligence for General Washington, Tallmadge ran a network of spies, many of whom were behind British lines. He is described as being diminutive, but underneath his gentle appearance, Tallmadge was a fierce cavalry officer. His unit, the 2nd Continental Dragoons, wore dark blue jackets with buff facings, buff breeches, tall black boots, and brass helmets with long white horsehair plumes. They made for an impressive-looking force as they operated along Pound Ridge. However, on the 30th of June one of Tallmadge’s spies, Luther Kinnicutt, rode hard toward his camp to warn them of Tarleton’s approaching force. Tallmadge readied his men immediately and began to move. Accused of harassing loyalists in the Neutral Ground, Clinton was eager to not only deal a decisive blow against the rebels, but also to send a clear message regarding their actions. Tarleton took to the new command with his usual vigor and implemented a plan that would soon become his signature attack move. He drove his men forward from Mile Square, through Bedford, and toward Pound Ridge. His intent was to surprise Tallmadge’s dragoons while they were foraging, however, Tallmadge’s spy interrupted this plot. Unaware that Tallmadge had received warning of his arrival, Tarleton’s troops left camp at 11:30 pm on July 1 in the middle of a vicious storm. The storm slowed their progress, frustrating Tarleton. He paused when he observed a civilian, John Crawford, standing outside of his home and asked the man for directions. Crawford, a loyalist, complied immediately, but Tarleton misunderstood his directions. He led his men in the wrong direction for about half a mile before he realized his mistake and turned them around: a fateful decision. As Tarleton’s men rode south, they ran head-first into Tallmadge’s forces approaching on the very same road. The two units collided into one another, Tarleton’s men reacting immediately and charging at Tallmadge’s troops. Tallmadge later recalled in his memoir that the attack was “violent,” and that the lane allowed “for no more than seven or eight in front.” Tallmadge quickly realized he and his men were outnumbered and turned his unit around, fleeing for Colonel Sheldon’s camp while Tarleton and his unit pursued them eagerly, “standing in their stirrups and shouting and whirling their swords over their heads.” Sheldon’s men were unprepared for the unexpected arrival of Tallmadge’s troops. Although they were mounted, they were still forming up with Tarleton’s men raced in, running right into the stationary cavalry unit. Unable to withstand the momentum of Tarleton’s charging force, Tallmadge and Sheldon’s men fled. Tarleton pursued them for four miles on slick, muddy roads as the storm raged on. A British dragoon neared one of Tarleton’s men and exclaimed, “Surrender you damned rebel, or I’ll blow your brains out.” Sheldon later reported that Tarleton “pushed hard on our rear for more than two miles. In the course of which a scattering of fire was kept up between their advance and our rear, and a constant charge with the sword.” Fueled on adrenaline, Tarleton tried to encircle the retreating rebel forces, but the rocky ground soon made the pursuit dangerous. Tarleton finally ordered his men to stop the chase and return to Pound Ridge, later recalling this encounter “trifling.” Tarleton left a surgeon at the scene to tend to his wounded dragoons as the rest of his forces marched back to camp. On their way back, the men passed the house of John Crawford, the Loyalist who had given them directions before. Tarleton immediately ordered that the man’s home to be burned in revenge for what Tarleton perceived was intentional deception by the Loyalist. He also ordered the burning of Major Lockwood’s house, but there was one minor issue with this order: the surgeons on both sides were treating wounded soldiers inside the house. Two of the British doctors protested Tarleton’s order, much to his aggravation. Tarleton ordered the injured be removed from Crawford’s home so they could search the residence. He also secured twelve of the American dragoons’ horses, including Tallmadge’s horse which had both his saddlebags and standard. Inside the saddlebags were twenty guineas intended to be given to Woodhull from Washington, alongside letters concerning Tallmadge’s intelligence work. In Tallmadge’s own memoir, he carefully avoided mentioning the letters that were stolen an instead simply stated: “I lost in the affray a fine horse, most of my field baggage, an twenty guineas in cash, which were taken in my valise with my horse.” After securing their new prizes, the British forces burned down the home, as well as the local meetinghouse, and stole Lockwood’s cattle. The citizens of Bedford fired upon Tarleton and his men, forcing them to abandon their stolen cattle as they made their way back to camp. In retaliation, Tarleton burned Bedford’s church and a Patriot-owned tavern. Shortly after, Sheldon’s Dragoons and an infantry unit re-formed and pursued Tarleton’s raiders up to North Castle Church, three miles west of Bedford. Despite their efforts, they were unable to overtake Tarleton’s lightning-fast unit. Tarleton and his men finally arrived back at their camp at 10:00 PM. Despite his exhaustion from the riding and fighting over the past nearly-24 hours, Tarleton sat down to write his report. He marked only one soldier killed and one other wounded, the losses minimal at best. He wrote the action as a British victory, although he did not actually achieve the original goal of routing the American cavalry nor did he capture Ebenezer Lockwood. Tarleton’s explanation for the damage he and his unit left in their wake was that “the inveteracy of the inhabitants of pound ridge and near Bedford in firing from houses and outhouses obliged me to burn some of their meeting and some of their dwelling houses with stores. I proposed to the militia terms that if they would not fire shots from the building, I would not burn them. They interpreted my mind proposal wrong imputing it to fear.” The American Forces had ten soldiers injured and four soldiers captured, including Major Lockwood’s son-in-law. Within Tallmadge’s saddlebags were correspondence with General Washington concerning his intelligence activities in New York. The entire ordeal was a great embarrassment to the American Forces. The correspondence contained information that revealed there was indeed an active spy by the alias of “Culper” and that Tallmadge was in charge of the intelligence service, likely operating a spy network on Long Island. Tarleton later wrote, “their disgrace in the loss of the standard of the regiment…was great.” Although losing a flag in a raid seems like a mild loss compared to giving valuable intelligence to the enemy, it was the first American flag that possessed thirteen red and white stripes. At the end of the war, Banastre smuggled the flag back home and for two centuries it hung in the Tarleton family home with pride. Sir Henry Clinton also took great pride in the moment and, desperate for some good news to send back home, forwarded Tarleton’s dispatch to the British War Office in London to serve as an example of his aggressive war campaign. The report was later published in the London Gazetteer, officially putting the British Legion into the public eye for the very first time. Clinton spent most of the summer marching the British army around New York, but the war in the north had reached stalemate-level. The army marched and camped through the rest of July, with Tarleton’s Legion leading the right vanguard, Simcoe’s Rangers leading the center, and Emmerick’s Chasseurs leading the left vanguard. On August 1, 1779, Clinton returned the forces to their camp at Kingsbridge. Tarleton then rode to New York on August 5th for a conference with his commander in chief and a visit with John Andre. During the time he was in New York, Simcoe controlled both the Legion and the Rangers, leading them around New York fortifications. However, during one of the many minor skirmishes that took place during this time, Simcoe was taken prisoner by the Americans after having his horse shot out from under him in October. This left the Legion and the Rangers under Tarleton’s command. While Clinton did not promote Tarleton for this new position, he did give him the additional title of commandant of the British Legion. During this time, Clinton began to worry over the public’s expectations of his forces, a worry that soon drove him into depression. Tarleton’s success had been one of Clinton’s few victories. The pressure slowly wore on his nerves, evident by the letter he penned to the Duke of Newcastle: “[T]his campaign I will work my utmost, but nothing can be expected from an Army above 20,000 men less than S[ir] W[illiam] Howe had.” As time went on, his confidence evaporated completely: “Your Grace will see that I can not be of the least use here, and shall therefore be permitted to go home…[America] I fear she will be lost.” Clinton dispatched Lieutenant Duncan Drummond to London to deliver his requested recall, but the effort was not successful. The king refused Clinton’s attempt to leave and stated that Clinton was “the only man who might still save America.” However, the king did not send Clinton any additional military resources that he greatly needed. Despite his reservations and negative sentiment, Clinton launched a campaign that would go down in history. In the Autumn of 1779, while the war in the north was at a stalemate, Clinton devised a new plan: he decided to sail down to Charleston, South Carolina to capture the city and then begin a campaign from the backcountry all the way up through North Carolina. This plan came from a letter Germain sent a year prior, pushing for a significant shift in direction. But, the actual carrying out of this massive sea and land campaign rested on Clinton’s shoulders alone. With America’s dependence on southern ports for exports, Clinton knew that controlling this region would cripple the rebel effort. He believed that the best way to annihilate Congress was to run it dry of money. After receiving dispatches claiming that the loyalists in South Carolina had grown weary of the American cause and their “opposition to the government,” Clinton began the military expedition. Tarleton agreed with Clinton’s plan, writing that “the mildness of the climate, the richness of the country, its vicinity to Georgia, and its distance from General Washington pointed out the advantage and facility of its conquest.” Clinton and Tarleton both disregarded the warnings from less-enthusiastic supporters who claimed that the southern colonies were not as passive and loyal as they thought. Clinton’s friend Henry Mellish wrote to him, warning that “The Carolinas are in the possession of the mob, Nova Scotia alone is dutiful.” Despite this warning, and many others, Clinton pressed forward with his plans in the south. In October of 1779, the Legion had returned to Long Island at Jericho and remained there until Clinton issued orders in December to sail south. The Legion left Long Island and disembarked at Savannah, Georgia in February of 1780. And so the infamous southern campaign of the American Revolution began. Sources: Anthony J. Scotti, Brutal Virtue: The Myth and Reality of Banastre Tarleton, 2019; Knight, The War at Saber Point: Banastre Tarleton and the British Legion, 77. John Knight, “Four Battleflags of the Revolution: Captured by Lt.-col. Banastre Tarleton,” Journal of the American Revolution, August 27, 2019. https://allthingsliberty.com/2019/08/four-battleflags-of-the-revolution-captured-by-lt-col-banastre-tarleton/. John Knight, The War at Saber Point: Banastre Tarleton and the British Legion, 77-80. Benjamin Tallmadge, Memoir of Colonel Benjamin Tallmadge, (New York: Kissinger, 1858), 32-43. Jay Harris, God’s Country: A History of Pound Ridge, New York (Chester, CT: Pequot Press, 1971): 38. Sheldon to Heath, The History of the Several Towns, Manors, and Patents of the County of Westchester, July 3, 1779 (New York: Roper, 1848), 2:122. Frederick Shonnard and Walter Spooner, History of Westchester County (New York: History Co., 1900), 457. Alexander Rose, Washington’s Spies: The Story of America’s First Spy Ring, (New York: Bantam Books Trade Paperbacks), 112-113. Frederick Shonnard and Walter Spooner, History of Westchester County (New York: History Co., 1900), 457. Michael Schellhammer, “Tarleton: Before He Became ‘Bloody Ban,’” Journal of the American Revolution, January 29, 2013. https://allthingsliberty.com/2013/01/tarleton-in-new-york/. Tarleton to Clinton, Camp on the Bronx, 2 July 1779, Colonial Office 5/98/257-259 TNA. Henry Clinton to George Germain, New York, 25 July 1779, K.G. Davies, ed., Documents of the American Revolution 1770-1783, Colonial Office Series (Shannon: Irish University Press, 1972), 17:168-170. Robert Bass, The Green Dragoon: The Lives of Banastre Tarleton & Mary Robinson, 1957, 57-58. Letter from General Sir Henry Clinton to H.F.C. Pelham-Clinton, 2nd Duke of Newcastle under Lyne, 3 July 1779, Ne C 2606, University of Nottingham, UK. Letter from General Sir Henry Clinton, New York, to H.F.C. Pelham-Clinton, 2nd Duke of Newcastle under Lyne, 11 July 1779, Ne C 2645, University of Nottingham, UK. William B. Wilcox, Portrait of a General: Sir Henry Clinton in the War of Independence, (New York: Knopf, 1964): 263. Carl P. Borick, A Gallant Defense: The Siege of Charleston, 1780 (Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 2012): 16. Banastre Tarleton, A History of the Campaigns of 1780 and 1781 in the Southern Provinces of North America, 16. Charles Mellish to Sir Henry Clinton, 10 September 1775, Clinton Papers, Vol. 18. Welcome back to my 14-part series on the life of Banastre Tarleton during the American Revolution! If you missed earlier installments, click the links below and read those chapters first. 1. Meet the Tarleton Family 2. Road to Revolution 3. "I'll Cut off General Lee's Head!" 4. Theater in Theatre 5. Legion Rising 6. Equine Design 7. Jericho Long Island had been a British occupied territory since it fell in 1776. It would remain under British and Loyalist control until the very end of the war. New York was the British go-to for winter quarters, supply resources, and a defensive front line against the rebel forces. While the activity in the British New York headquarters was adequately recorded, the movements and actions of the various troops were not. This includes the activities of Tarleton’s British Legion who occupied the island from late 1778 through early 1779. During that winter, the Legion’s actions on Long Island reveal more about the unit’s unique characteristics that played a part in its overall reputation. The British and Hessian forces soon became well-known for their thievery on Long Island. As Lord Howe arrived, many Loyalists assured him that the island was a fertile one, populous, and full of loyal subjects to the Crown. However, these vast, promised supplies soon ran dry as the British took over Jericho. Tensions between soldiers and citizens steadily rose as the winter went on, primarily due to the perceived lack of respect shown by British troops. Plundering and robbing the local citizenry left the Legion with few local friends. In a matter of seven months of 1778, the British forces consumed 3.5 million pounds of bread and flour and 2 million pounds of meat more than the British Treasury had previously anticipated. Acquiring provisions became a constant problem. The British began organizing foraging parties, stealing food and supplies from even those who pledged fealty to the Crown. One such Loyalist by the name of Isaac Lefferts arrived back home only to discover that a British foraging unit had pastured about fifty of their horses in his orchard. Lefferts begged the unit to move the horses to another field full of hay, but the British did not acquiesce. Instead, their horses destroyed his apple crop. Another man named Israel Okely lost his barn to the British cavalry units so they could stable one-hundred of their horses. The horses ate three-hundred bushels of oats. Neither man received any form of payment for their losses. The British Legion arrived in Jericho on November 1, 1778. Tarleton and his men quartered with the wealthy farmers in the region, allowing their horses to grow fat on the pastures. However, the relaxation and privilege only lasted for so long. Legionnaires patrolled out of Fort Nonsense in bitter cold temperatures and dense fog. The repetitive work and routine began to wear them down. Tarleton wrote that their responsibilities consisted of nothing more than having to “Forage for food flour etc. for the whole army quartered in New York.” As demonstrated in their antics during the occupation of Philadelphia, boredom led to trouble. The issues that would later tarnish the reputation of the British Legion began to emerge during their stay on Long Island. The Legion quartered in Jericho in the township of Oyster Bay while the 17th Light Dragoons quartered in Hempstead. Jericho was located at the crossroads of many roadways that allowed access to Hempstead to the south, Jamaica and New York to the west, and further east on Long Island. There was sufficient room to allow the cavalry horses to graze and keep them fit for after the winter came to an end and the brutal summer heat began. Tarleton wrote to Seth Norton, a British forage master, on November 11, 1778 from Jericho stating, “I am to request that you furnish the Bearer with a Barrel of Oatmeal for the Foxhounds.” Clearly Tarleton had additional plans aside from simply gathering necessary supplies for the British forces. Aside from Tarleton’s note, there were several others accounting for the British Legion, 17th Light Dragoons, and other provincial forces in Jericho. Many high-ranking officers of the army were there at the time as well, including Brigadier General William Erskine who commanded the British troops on Long Island. A letter to George Washington from an informant confirmed this information. At the time, Erskine was establishing works around Dr. James Townsend’s home where he was quartered. General Parsons wrote that 700 troops were stationed in Jericho, and in December, Seth Norton recorded that Simcoe “is to be at Jericho.” This record indicates that the Queen’s Rangers accompanied Tarleton’s Legion during their 1778-1779 winter encampment. The Legion is said to have constructed “Fort Nonsense” on a hill near Dr. Townsend’s barn, according to nineteenth century historian Henry Onderdonk. It is also believed that the British chose this particular property as a way to punish Dr. Townsend for his involvement as a member of the provincial congress before British forces took over the island. Not much is known regarding the precise location of the Legion’s post at Jericho. Fort Nonsense was a frequently-used name of forts during the Revolution era, including Patriot forts. The name was often used in jest, mocking the establishment or location of the forts themselves. There is a chance this particular Fort Nonsense was named such. According to John Graves Simcoe’s journal: “Sir William Erskine came to Oyster Bay, intentionally to remove the corps to Jericho, a quarter of the Legion was to quit in order to accompany him to the east end of the island. Lt. Col. Simcoe represented to him, that in case of the enemy’s passing the sound, both Oyster bay and Jericho were at too great a distance from any post to expect succor, but that the latter was equally liable to surprize as Oyster bay, that its being farther from the coast was no advantage, as the enemy acquainted with the country, and in league with the disaffected inhabitants of it, could have full time to penetrate, undiscovered , through the woods… Sir William Erskine was pleased to agree with Lt. Col. Simcoe; and expressed himself highly satisfied with the means had been taken to ensure the post.” A raid at Smithtown from November 21 through the 24th provides additional information regarding the British Legion’s actions in the Suffolk County region. At the Inn of Epinetus Smith on November 21, Colonel Tarleton and Major Cochrane accrued a rather large bill of services and provisions from the innkeeper. These provisions included animals, alcohol, silk, and building material. Tarleton specifically acquired four sheets, a new Petticoat, and a silk handkerchief. In addition to these goods, an inventory record from November 12 revealed that one ton of hay was taken from Dr. James Townsend’s residence in Jericho, alongside fifteen tons of hay from Benjamin Townsend’s home nearby. That same month, boards “of the best pine” were taken “for the use of the Government by Colonel Tarleton and Major Cochran.” Norton frequently complained about the actions of the Legion during their stay in Jericho. He said, “if the Quartermaster’s of the Legion are not restrained by the particular Order from Headquarters (for they will pay no attention to any Commissary’s Order) from taking the Forage, engaged for this Magazine I shall not be able to get even a sufficiency for this Corps.” Norton also cited an incident a few days prior regarding the “Forage” Tarleton and Cochran obtained “without granting receipts.” He elaborated, stating that the inhabitants complained of the incident and Simcoe drove the problematic legionnaires away. According to Norton, the Legion had more “Forage” than their horses could consume that season. It is especially interesting to note that Simcoe and his Rangers chose to drive off the rabble-rousing officers. Simcoe wrote in his journal, “A young corps raised in the midst of active service, and without the habits of discipline, which are learnt in time of peace, required the strictest attention in this point.” The British Legion was very eager to show their worth in the British forces, but in their eagerness, they exhibited behaviors that would later plague the Legion as a whole. With no enemy forces to drive away, the Legion turned to the other activity they were quite skillful in: drinking. Alcohol was a common substance used by both sides of the American Revolution, both socially and medically. However, at least one troop of the British Legion became so ill-behaved while drinking during their stay in Jericho that an unusual sanction had to be enforced. On rare occasions, alcohol could be withheld from specific soldiers should their conduct become so uncontrollable that they cause “much harm by ruining discipline and good behavior.” Captain John Scott’s entry in his orderly book for November 11, 1778 reads, “The Commanding Officers has Directed the Rum of the Scotch Company to be Stopped…and theay may expect will Be Continued…Untill theay Discover the guilty person Or a Sufficient Quantity is Stopt to to Repay the Inhabitants.” However, just eight days after this entry, Scott wrote that “URQUART & Daniel INNISS of the Scotch Company On Suspicion of Killing Cattle and plundering the Inhabitants, A quantity of fresh meat &c. being found in their possession.” Several other entries list the names and crimes of other members of the regiment. Although these crimes appear petty in nature, they demonstrated a lack of discipline and lack of care for the law within the regiment itself. These acts would later lead to more serious crimes such as robbery and mutilation. An example of such a crime occurred on March 2, 1779 when a man by the name of Daniel Sandford was riding his horse to Southampton and was overtaken by Thomas Connoly, a private dragoon in the British Legion. Connoly drew his piston on Sandford and demanded to know if he was carrying money. Sandford simply replied that he travelled light and Collonly became incensed. He stated, “Damn you, deliver your purse or you are a dead man.” Sandford gave up his nearly-empty purse, infuriating Connoly all the more. He began to search the man feverishly, “striking him several times with his naked sword.” After finding nothing else of value, Connoly pointed to a nearby home and demanded to know if there was money inside. Sandford feigned knowledge of the home and answered there was indeed money in the dwelling, so Connonly forcibly marched him toward the building. Connoly began to engage with the man who owned the home, John Grimes, and Sandford took the opportunity to flee. Ignoring the fleeing man, Connoly asked Grimes if he knew what time it was. The moment Grimes pulled out his watch, Connoly took it from him, called him “a Rebel.” Grimes was aghast at the accusation and, as Connoly tried to ride off on his horse, grabbed the bridle. Connoly pulled out his pistol again and swore that “if he did not let go, he would blow his brains out.” Connoly nearly escaped, however he ran into William Taylor, adjutant of the Legion. Taylor realized Connoly was intoxicated and disheveled, immediately raising his suspicions. Taylor searched Connoly and discovered the stolen watch and purse. Immediately he placed Connoly under arrest and had him court-martialed. Connoly’s only defense during the trial was to state that he had been under the influence of liquor. Connoly was found guilty of highway robbery and sentenced to death by hanging. This punishment was meant to put fear into the hearts of the other legionnaires and prevent them from acting in a similar fashion, however just a few days after Connoly’s hanging, another legionnaire found himself court-martialed. And so began a series of court-martials that would continue throughout the winter months. Tarleton was not well-known for his restraint or discipline when it came to such behavior either. During this time, he was unable to control his men, revealing a potential lack of experience and maturity on his part. The behavior of the Legion even caught the attention of Cornwallis. He warned Tarleton to find a way to curb the behavior of his men and Tarleton replied, “I am sorry your Lordship has cause to complain of the plundering of the Legion. The officers have kept me in ignorance, or steps should have been taken immediately to suppress it.” The chances of Tarleton’s statement being true are rather slim. More than likely he simply used the traditional go-to of pleading ignorance to avoid further upsetting Cornwallis. Shortly after these incidents, the 17th Light Dragoons were seconded to the Legion. On the record, this was for training purposes, but off the record it was likely done to help instill discipline in Tarleton’s men. The 17th Light Dragoons were the only British cavalry regiment by 1779 and were known for their dyed-red horsetails that hung from their helmets with a death’s-head emblem on the front. They were known as the “Death or Glory Boys” and wore tight red jackets and tall brass helmets. The disciplinary issues in the Legion began to improve after the arrival of the 17th Light Dragoons. While the unit never officially became a permanent part of the Legion, they did fight alongside Tarleton’s Legion and proved their worth many times over. Tarleton, during these winter months at Jericho, kept up to his old vices of gambling and women. He found himself rather bored and lonely, writing back to his family pleading for money and swearing he had stopped his gambling habits, which of course was not the case. However, despite Tarleton’s advancement in the British Forces, his constant financial issues remained a source of tension between him and his family. His family began to pressure him to return to England to settle his debts, but Tarleton adamantly replied “Why should I return to England? My honour as a solider would instantly fade, and all probability of restitution would vanish forever.” Banastre’s mother, by this time, knew her son’s promises to stop gambling and to repay her the money he owed were likely never going to be fulfilled. When Tarleton wasn’t playing cards or enjoying the company of women, he introduced the sport of cricket to New York. Notices in newspapers calling for men of the army and navy to join the Legion in their games of cricket every Saturday morning. Foxhunting also became a regular pastime, as indicated by Tarleton’s request for oatmeal for the foxhounds. At the beginning of 1779, the units left Jericho for Sag Harbor, the eastern end of Long Island, and quartered there. The continued drudgery work of patrols and foraging resumed once they were settled. The Legion saw no action aside from three rebel ships when they attempted to commandeer the British ship Neptune on February 1. Unable to overcome the retaliation by the Neptune or the forces on shore, the three ships attempted to flee. One ran aground and Major Charles Cochrane took full advantage of the situation. After forcing the rebels to abandon the ship, Cochrane boarded it and discovered enough supplies for six months out at sea. While the drudgery work continued aside from this one moment of excitement, Tarleton became more and more frustrated. However, for Banastre and his British Legion, these days of rest and plenty were soon coming to an end. Clinton ordered an advance through the New York highlands, officially beginning the summer campaign of 1779. Sources: David M. Griffin. “Oatmeal for the Foxhounds: Tarleton in Jericho,” Journal of the American Revolution: Conflict & War, The War Years (1775-1782), January 31, 2018. https://allthingsliberty.com/2018/01/oatmeal-foxhounds-tarleton-jericho/. The North British Intelligencer or Constitutional Miscellany, Edinburgh, Vol 1, 221, National Library of Australia, https://catalogue.nla.gov.au/Record/3140156. John Knight, The War at Saber Point: Banastre Tarleton and the British Legion, 66-74. Stephen Davidson, “How to Lose Friends and Dishearten Loyalists,” Loyalist Trails, United Empire Loyalists’ Association of Canada (February 3, 2008): http://www.uelac.org/Loyalist-Trails/2008/Loyalist-Trails-2008.php?issue=200805. Tarleton Family Archives, Liverpool Records Office, NRA 7189. Revolution in America: Confidential Letters and Journals 1776-1784 of Adjutant General Major Baurmeister of the Hessian Forces (New Jersey: Rutgers University Press, 1957), 229-319. Seth Norton, Revolutionary War Papers, Hofstra University’s Long Island Studies Institute, Nassau County Museum Reference Collection, 1775. Lewis J. Costigin to Washington, December 13, 1778, Founders Online, National Archives. Collection of papers of Reuben Smith Norton and Seth Norton, Connecticut State Library. Henry Jr. Onderdonk, Documents and Letters Intended to Illustrate the Revolutionary Incidents of Queens County: With Connecting Narratives, Explanatory Notes, and Additions (New York: Leavitt, Trow and Company, 1846), 209-210. Richard A. Winsche, “The Jericho Historic Preserve,” The Nassau County Historical Society Journal, Volume 39, 1984. John Graves Simcoe, Simcoe’s Military Journal: A History of the Operations of a Partisan Corps Called the Queen’s Rangers, Commanded by Lieut. Col. J.G. Simcoe, During the War of the Revolution (New York: Bartlett & Welford, 1844), 22, 94. Blydenburgh Manuscript: Inhabitants of Smithtown v. King George III, Smithtown Historical Society, Smithtown, NY, 1783. Robert Jackson. A Treatise on the Fevers of Jamaica: With Some Observations on the Intermitting Fever of America (London: J. Murray, 1791), 397. Captain John Scott. Legion Orders, Scott Orderly Book. Andre de Coppett Collection, Princeton University: November 11, 1778. War Office, Class 71, Vol. 88, 341-344, TNA. Anthony J. Scotti, Brutal Virtue: The Myth and Reality of Banastre Tarleton, 2019. John W. Fortescue, A History of the 17th Lancers. London: Macmillan, 1895: 63. Tarleton’s Letter Home to his Family on December 25, 1778, Tarleton Family Archives, NRA 7189. Royal American Gazette, New York, October 28, 1778. Major Charles Cochrane to Major General Sir William Erskine. New York Gazette and the Weekly Mercury, February 8, 1779. Welcome back to my 14-part series on the life of Banastre Tarleton during the American Revolution! If you missed earlier installments, click the links below and read those chapters first. 1. Meet the Tarleton Family 2. Road to Revolution 3. "I'll Cut off General Lee's Head!" 4. Theater in Theatre 5. Legion Rising 6. Equine Design The success of the Kingsbridge attack provides a clear demonstration of the need for effective light infantry and dragoon units. However, the British had few and far between of these particular and unique troops. The reason for the lack of such units? There was no need for them. Britain is a small country, so there was no true need for light infantry and dragoon units. However, the open-plains of America demonstrated a need for these particular troops. Prior to the American Revolution, there Lord North had three regiments of Household Calvary, seven regiments of Dragoon Guards, and six regiments of the Light Dragoons stationed both home and abroad. Of these units only the 16th and 17th Light Dragoons were dispatched to America, and only the 17th Light Dragoon unit would remain for the duration of the war. Training these units was an expensive endeavor, one Britain was reluctant to finance. However, after the defeats at Brandywine and Long Island, the need to train and raise these units became more than evidence. British Loyalists possessed a greater understanding of the American terrain and often advised British commanders that cavalry units were preferred over foot units. The Georgia governor, Sir James Wright, wrote to Cornwallis, imploring him to send dragoon units. In his words, “150 to 200 horse will have a better effect in the Province than 600 foot.” However, the British Treasury refused to provide the funds. British Commanders were instructed to create their own Loyalist militias and utilize those to enforce law and order in the colonies. Cornwallis commented on Wright’s request to another officer, stating that “he must embody some Militia,” and that the cost of doing so could not come from “the Military Chest which is not capable of answering too violent demands.” The lack of cavalry was a strategic failing on the part of the British, but for Tarleton himself, it was an opportunity to shine. The British commanders continued augmenting the British Legion instead of recruiting new cavalry units. Tarleton was left with few rivals to contend with and stood out among his peers as a result. The longer the war dragged out, the more and more the British commanders relied on Tarleton and his Legion—and Tarleton was not a man to miss a chance to excel. He latched onto the opportunity and pushed himself and his men regularly, eager to achieve fame and success as quickly as possible. Tarleton was mostly left to his own devices when it came to training his men and choosing his fighting methods. His natural lack of patience combined with his informal demeanor later resulted in the creation of a guerilla-style warfare that became a mainstay in the southern theater. Although Tarleton can be described as rather vain, he was not a domineering commander. He was much more concerned with the end results than he was the way they were achieved. While many other British officials and officers focused on following certain regiments, form, and ritual, Tarleton had no qualms about adapting his methods whenever necessary. This even included the style of the uniforms he outfitted his Legion with. Tarleton soon found out that the southern regions of the colonies were incredibly hot and muggy during the summers. He started marching his troops during the evenings and had them remove their tight woolen jackets so that they were only wearing loose, white linen shirts. They started doing this so often that Simcoe even gave them a nickname, the “White Horse.” While other Loyalist units began transitioning to redcoats in 1778 through 1779, the British Legion remained in their green uniforms. The only other unit to do this was Simcoe’s Rangers. As time went on, the British Legion also adopted the nickname “Green Horse.” A Hessian officer provided a description of the British Legion uniforms, stating they wore “Short Round Green Tight Jacketts (sic), Black Collar and Cuffs.” It is likely that both the cavalry and infantry units wore the leather dragoon helmets as well. The most important part of the British Legion was of course the horse. And Tarleton himself was a man who appreciated and thoroughly understood the need for good horses. Robert Bass’ book about Tarleton begins with a particularly interesting story involving a wild black stallion and our young, intrepid dragoon. According to Bass, a young Tory stated: “I have witnessed many stirring scenes, both during the Revolution and since, but I never saw one half so exciting as the one between that savage man and that savage horse!” The man said Tarleton had been told about an unmanageable horse that was magnificent in stature and breed. The description alone excited Banastre and he purchased the animal outright, claiming he would be the one to break the horse in. “The mad brute will be the death of him,” the Tory stated, watching with trepidation as the horse was brought before Tarleton. He watched as Tarleton waited until everyone’s eyes were upon him, and then he mounted the horse, calling for his men to let the animal loose. Tarleton reportedly rode the horse, despite its dramatic attempts to throw him off, and, through use of the spur and a whip, eventually managed to subdue the animal. Tarleton dismounted and walked away, the horse following “him around like a dog.” The bloodied and sweaty horse, and very-pale-Tarleton, left the area to recover from their ordeal. Whether or not the account of Tarleton taming a wild horse is true, it was clear through his strict regimen of training and caring for the horses that the dragoon considered the horse to be the most important aspect of the British Legion. Written into their schedules were times to tend to their horses’ needs, rest them, and repair any riding equipment that may have been damaged. The standing orders for dragoons as of 1782 provided strict instructions regarding horse-care, including cleaning out the stalls, sweeping stables, providing adequate water and food, sufficient hay, and proper brushing techniques. All of these duties were to be carried out before a soldier was permitted to take his own breakfast. The care of the horse was the center of every cavalry officer’s day. While the standing orders themselves read as rather micromanaging or pedantic, the success of the dragoons’ operations, and even their own lives, depended on their horses. And Tarleton made sure that each and every horse was seen to properly by its rider. The horse-care schedule also ensured that both horse and rider were always prepared and in good physical condition. Perhaps even more important, the routines established a bond between rider and horse, a vital aspect when in the middle of a chaotic battle. A former British Legion officer once wrote that, “we had no sore backs; for a blanket, six or eight times doubled, was always laid on the horse’s back, under the saddle…The best captain of cavalry, I know, is not he who only fights his troop well in action; but he who has his horses in the best condition, and has the fewest sore backs in his troop.” The British Legion is famously known for their use of the saber, but this was not always the case with light dragoon units prior to the American Revolution. In Europe, light dragoon forces typically used a carbine that was capable of being fitted with a bayonet, and their officers were trained on how to shoot from the saddle. However, Tarleton believed that such weaponry actually made a cavalry unit less-effective. They were incredibly inaccurate, especially when on the back of a horse at full-gallop. In order to use the weapon effectively, an officer would be forced to bring his horse to a halt, aim, and then fire, wasting precious time and endangering both himself and the horse. This would also diminish the shock value, a major strategic advantage of light dragoon units. The British Legion in particular carried various pistols, but there is no record of the Legion getting involved in a static gunfight. Tarleton chose to, instead, believe that the saber provided the accuracy, speed, and efficiency that his unit needed to successfully carry out their missions. The British Legion’s offensive might come from their speed rather than the weapon. The horses Tarleton used for his unit would have weighed approximately eight to nine hundred pounds, along with a man atop, this created an approximately one-thousand-pound, fast-moving projectile. It became a staple of the Legion’s fighting techniques to “charge home,” turning their horses to the enemy with their swords in hand, and ride as fast as possible. The shock of horses charging at full-speed would create utter chaos, confusing and startling the enemy. In the malay, the cavalry officers would use their sabers to hack away at the enemy soldiers. Tarleton’s primary tactic soon became breaking his enemy by charging through their lines in this manner, then get his enemy on the run. Once on the run, they had their backs to his unit, making them significantly more vulnerable to their sabers. This became their trademark maneuver, and the fodder for many stories and folklore that would follow the Legion long after the American Revolution came to an end. Banastre Tarleton, alongside Simcoe, Rawdon, and Patrick Ferguson, redefined and transformed the character of the provincial corps. They would no longer work directly under the main army. Instead, under the leadership and guidance of these four young men, they would operate as effective and formidable, independent units. Traditional cavalry roles such as intelligence and supply gathering would no longer be their primary focus. Instead, the British Legion and their sister-units became essential to the war in the southern theater, able to track down the elusive American militia units and guerilla warfare techniques, a feat the main contingent of the British Army could not have accomplished at the time. In fact, the British Legion became too-heavily relied upon as the only unit capable of acting as an effective counterinsurgency weapon, a factor that would later play a part in determining the victor of the American Revolution. Sources Robert Bass, The Green Dragoon: The Lives of Banastre Tarleton & Mary Robinson, 1957 John Knight, The War at Saber Point: Banastre Tarleton and the British Legion, 2020 Governor Sir James Wright to Sir Henry Clinton, April 6, 1780, Report on American Manuscripts in the Royal Institution of Great Britain (London: H.M. Stationary off. by Mackie), 1:111 Cornwallis to Lt. Colonel Alured Clarke, Charlestown, PRO 30/55/24/ff. 16-17, TNA Earnest Sanger, Englishmen at War: A Social History in Letters 1450-1900 (Portland, ME: Sutton, 1993): 183 Anthony J Scotti, Brutal Virtue: The Myth and Reality of Banastre Tarleton, 2019 John Graves Simcoe, Simcoe’s Military Journal: A History of the Operations of a Partisan Corps Called the Queen’s Rangers, Commanded by Lieut. Col. J.G. Simcoe, During the War of the Revolution (New York: Bartlett & Welford, 1844), 209-210 The Dragoon Standing Orders of 1782 George Hanger, Colonel George Hanger, to All Sportsmen (London: printed for George Hanger, 1814), 123-124. Banastre Tarleton, A History of the Campaigns of 1780 and 1781 in the Southern Provinces of North America (London: T. Cadell, 1787), 18. Welcome back to my 14-part series on the life of Banastre Tarleton during the American Revolution! If you missed earlier installments, click the links below and read those chapters first. This particular chapter was co-researched and co-written by both myself and Michael E. Carter, M.A. 1. Meet the Tarleton Family 2. Road to Revolution 3. "I'll Cut off General Lee's Head!" 4. Theater in Theatre 5: Legion Rising There were many famous units which fought in the American Revolution for the British, but perhaps the infamous was the British Legion. The reputation this unique division acquired during the war forever cemented them into the hearts and minds of Americans as the worst of villains. Their aggressive tactics and superb horsemanship made the Legion the both the most relentless and the most reviled. Even today the Legion’s activities in Virginia and the Carolinas spark anger and disgust. Most of their exploits exist in tales which closely resemble folklore rather than fact. However, in Nova Scotia, where the Legion settled after the war and many of their descendants still reside, their story has nearly disappeared entirely. Perhaps this is because, as the old adage says, history is written by the victors. Perhaps it is because the British Legion has been so demonized in American history books that many have chosen to just accept these interpretations and tales as fact and prefer to forget the Legion ever existed. Regardless, the British Legion, and the man who led it, deserve to have their story told from a different, less-biased, perspective. The British Legion, which later became known as Tarleton’s Legion, acted as the spearhead of every attack, the rearguard in every retreat, and spies for General Cornwallis. They were integral to the Southern Campaign, but their history begins in the summer of 1778 during the British campaign in the north. After Sir Henry Clinton received his orders to leave Philadelphia and withdraw to New York, a regiment called the Queen’s Rangers began to take shape. Camped alongside the Harlem River, the regiment was led by the 26-year-old John Graves Simcoe. Simcoe trained his regiment to adapt to the conditions in the colonies, opted for a green uniform to blend in better, and equipped them to act as calvary, infantry, and artillery all rolled into one. Tarleton, during this time, was also camped along the Harlem River, observing Simcoe’s training of his Queen’s Rangers. Two years younger than Simcoe, Tarleton found the older officer intriguing. Simcoe felt the same. The young officers’ shared ambition and energy drew them to one another, a relationship that likely shaped Tarleton’s own personal decisions regarding his future Legion. The British Legion was a combined unit of Provincial cavalry and infantry, commissioned and raised by Lord William Cathcart in 1778. Cathcart was part of a new, younger generation, to include Simcoe and Tarleton, which craved command but were hindered by the slow promotion process of the British Army. In July of 1778, Cathcart proposed his idea of raising a Loyalist corps of infantry and cavalry to Sir Henry Clinton. Cathcart recommended his friend, Banastre Tarleton, command the cavalry. After serving the previous two campaigns as a volunteer attachment to the 16th Light Dragoons and as a major-of-brigade to the British cavalry in Philadelphia, the prospect of commanding his own unique unit thrilled Banastre. It was clear that both Tarleton and Cathcart found themselves to be more than the average subordinate and Sir Henry Clinton’s response to Cathcart’s proposition confirmed this fact. He hastened the process of forming the Legion by using a cadre of corps from previously-formed Provincial units. Cathcart’s infantry came from Caledonian Volunteers, Royal American Reformees, and Roman Catholic Volunteers, while Tarleton’s cavalry consisted of the two troops of Philadelphia Light Dragoons and an independent troop created by David Kinloch in New York. Early on in the Revolution, the Legion consisted of four infantry companies with three cavalry troops, with 333 men in total. During the winter of 1778-1779, the unit’s actions on Long Island provided an early look into what they would become. During this time, various records revealed that the Legion prioritized supply acquisition, but they also revealed potential disciplinary issues within the unit, issues that would later define the unit as a whole. In November of 1778, an account record kept by the Society of Smithtown included a claim for the Society for a total of 127 pounds 18 shillings 4 pence for 6396 feet of boards at 20 pounds 9 shillings per thousand taken from a Presbyterian church. The note stated: “The above boards were of the best pine and taken for the use of the Government by Colonel Tarleton and Major Cochran.” What these materials were used for is uncertain, but they were likely utilized in the building of winter fortifications at Jericho or acquired for shipment to support the troops in New York. Seth Norton, a forage master for the British Army, frequently complained about the Legion’s conduct. He complained about the amount of material the Legion took and expanded on his complaints by stating: “two or three days they were at Wolver Hollow about four miles from this, taking all kinds of Forage without granting receipts…they return the next day and they have at Jericho, including the Plain Hay more Forage than the number of horses now they ought to consume this season.” The precise location of the British Legion’s post at Jericho remains unknown, but the force was present and active in Long Island during the 1778-1779 winter season, as indicated by numerous documents and accounts of their foraging efforts. They were a brand-new unit, eager to prove themselves. Their leaders were also young, new, and ambitious. The Legion therefore went to great lengths to prove their usefulness for the British cause. The formation of the Legion itself was revolutionary. It demonstrated forward-thinking and innovation. This unit would act independently of the rest of the British army, but it was more or less stitched together haphazardly using both rebel turncoats and Loyalists. This resulted in a unit full of men who had very little in common regarding their backgrounds, heritage, culture, and the like. It would take an enigmatic leader willing and able to bring these men together to form a cohesive, effective unit. And it would take discipline, maturity, and experience to keep them in line. Following the Patriot defeat at the Battle of Monmouth, Banastre Tarleton led his newly-formed British Legion in their first major action. The British were in desperate need of cavalrymen, and Tarleton was known for his expertise in all-things-equine. With limited competition for his particular skillsets, Tarleton quickly caught the eyes of those in command. On August 1, 1788, at the age of twenty-three, Tarleton was promoted to the rank of Lieutenant Colonel and immediately threw himself into drilling his men hard. Just a few weeks after his promotion, Tarleton received the chance to show off what he had accomplished thus far against a unique force of Continentals. Led by a man named Daniel Nimham, several hundred Stockbridge Native Americans lived as an American-aligned displaced group of Christian Mohican and Munsee-speaking people who recently relocated to the Hudson Highlands in New York. Nimham once visited the King of England in 1766 to try and convince the King to stop the land frauds committed against his people. He later became an officer in Washington’s army and served alongside his twenty-two-year-old son, Abraham Nimham. The two men shared command of the sixty-member Stockbridge Indian Company and were known as extraordinary woodland fighters. They assisted Washington’s army during the battle of White Plains in July of 1778 and followed the General’s command to “annoy the enemy and prevent their landing or making [any] incursion into the country.” The British, however, did not appreciate how they followed through with Washington’s command, and word of the active enemy Native American force near the edge of New York began to ruffle feathers. This reached a fever pitch in August when the Stockbridge company ambushed a Loyalist force commanded by Andreas Emmerick. This surprise attack sparked outrage among the British, especially General Clinton and John Graves Simcoe. Clinton rallied five hundred under Simcoe’s command. The Queen’s Rangers, alongside Banastre Tarleton’s British Legion, then began to plan a revenge attack against the Native American force. The battle between the Queen’s Rangers, British Legion and the Stockbridge Native Americans took place near Van Cortlandt Manor, a large estate located between Broadway and the Bronx River. Between the estate and the river was Mile Square Road which connected the Albany Post Road with the Mile Square in Westchester County. The ground where the battle was fought upon is still accessible today through preservation efforts and has been named the Van Cortlandt Park. The locations and physical land markers described in Simcoe’s journal are also still there and accessible to the public. On the morning of August 31st, with the Queen’s Rangers, British Legion, and retreating Hessians, the British mounted their counterattack. They set a trap, created and led by Simcoe, Tarleton, and Emmerick, on Cortlandt’s Ridge. Unfortunately for the Stockbridge Indian Company, they fell directly into the Brit’s trap. Seeing Emmerick’s troops, the Native Americans emerged into the open, prepared to fight. At that moment, Simcoe’s infantry made their move, hitting the left flank of the Indian Company. The Native Americans were surrounded and greatly outnumbered. They attempted to fight back, utilizing hand-to-hand combat techniques. They were so effective that, according to Simcoe’s own account, they managed to pull several cavalrymen from their horses. Simcoe was wounded in this exchange, and described the Native American forces after the battle, writing that, “The Indians fought most gallantly.” Simcoe also wrote that Daniel Nimham called out to his fellow men that “he was old and would stand and die there.” Nimham was later cut down and killed by Simcoe’s orderly, Private Edward Wight. Nimham reportedly crawled off the battlefield toward a stream where his body was later found. After Simcoe’s forces launched their attack, Tarleton unleashed his British Legion, composed of 175 horsemen. His attack broke through the Native American’s defensive line, causing them to turn and flee. Tarleton’s Legion hunted them down, killing most. The few Native Americans who survived the onslaught escaped to Tibbetts Brook. General Scott reported to General Washington later: “There are no more than 14 Indians Yet com[sic] in. Among the missing is Capt. Nimham and his father.” Simcoe’s British-Hessian-Loyalist unit lost two cavalrymen with six wounded. Estimates of the Native Americans from the Stockbridge Indian Company who were killed range from seventeen to forty, with the larger estimate likely being the most accurate. Banastre Tarleton was among the cavalrymen who were unseated from their horses by the Native American war-fighters, according to Simcoe’s recollection of the events. This was the closest Tarleton would come to dying during the Revolutionary War. Simcoe said, “That active officer had a narrow escape; in striking at one of the fugitives, he lost his balance and fell from his horse. Luckily the Indian had no bayonet, and his musket had been discharged.” Tarleton was lucky this day, while the Americans and their Native allies were not. The skirmish itself ended the Mohican threat in the Hudson Highlands, thrilling Tarleton. Simcoe praised Tarleton in his journal, noting that Tarleton was “full of enterprise and spirit, and anxious for every opportunity to distinguish himself.” Likewise, Cornwallis later praised Tarleton and his dragoons, impressed by their success, and stated that they “sabered a great many” Native Americans on that day. There is only one confirmed contemporary depiction of a Stockbridge companyman. A Hessian captain named Johann von Ewald sketched in his journal based on his on observation and entitled it: “An Indian of the Stockbridge Tribe”. In his writings, he would affirm that they, like their American allies, fought bravely but no Indian received quarter. He named Nimham among the dead, titling him a chief, before describing his examination of the fallen indigenous – his wording. He referred to their well-built bodies being distinct among the dead of European descent and commented that their faces seemed to indicate that they “perished with resolution” before making a comparison to his Germanic ancestors who fought under Arminius, a Roman office turned rebel chieftain who emerged as a German national hero. In doing so, he connected the men of Stockbridge, American Indians, to the history of ancient Europe.
Finally, he described their appearance further including dress and armament. Their shirt and a long pair of trousers were “coarse linen” paired with deerskin shoes and a hat made of bast, the inner fibers of a tree. Each of the Stockbridge fighters were armed with a long gun, described as either a musket or rifle, as well as a quiver with approximately twenty arrows, although not named, they are presumably had means in which to shoot those arrows. Extra detail was given to a short battle axe, perhaps a tomahawk, given how von Ewald added “they knew how to throw very skillfully”. Lastly, he noted rings in their nose and ears as well as how their hair was styled: “[O]nly the hair of the crown remained standing in a circle the size of a dollar-piece, the remainder being shaved off bare”. Ironically, it is thanks to this enemy mercenary that Americans have any idea of what these heroic revolutionary allies looked like. After Tarleton, Simcoe and Emmerick’s forces pulled their lines back to Kingsbridge, the local residents searched through the battlefield for survivors. The few wounded survivors were taken to nearby homes to receive treatment for their injuries. Days after the battle, the residents began to notice that their dogs were behaving oddly. They followed their dogs and discovered, to their horror, the remains of Nimham, most of which had been devoured by the dogs, along with the bodies of several of his fellows. The residents took the remains and interred them in a plot called Indian Field. They placed stones over their graves to prevent other animals from desecrating their bodies. Approximately eighteen Stockbridge Native Americans are said to be buried there alongside other Native American warriors. Sources: Thomas H. Randall, “Tarleton’s Legion.” Collections of the Nova Scotia Historical Society, 1949. http://www.merseyheritage.ca/tarletonslegion.html. Todd W. Braisted, “Review: War at Saber Point: Banastre Tarleton and the British Legion,” People, Reviews, The War Years (1775-1783). May 10, 2021. https://allthingsliberty.com/2021/05/review-war-at-saber-point-banastre-tarleton-and-the-british-legion/. State of particular Companies of the Provincial Corps for a General Muster &ca Feby. 1779,” Dreer Collection, Misc. Mss No. 11, Historical Society of Pennsylvania. David M. Griffin, “Oatmeal for the Foxhounds: Tarleton in Jericho,” Conflict & War, The War Years (1775-1783). January 31, 2018. https://allthingsliberty.com/2018/01/oatmeal-foxhounds-tarleton-jericho/. Blydenburgh Manuscript: inhabitants of Smithtown v. King George III, transcribed from the original document residing at the Smithtown Historical Society, Smithtown, NY, 1783. Seth Norton Papers, Connecticut State Library, Revolutionary War papers, 1775. Robert Bass, The Green Dragoon: The Lives of Banastre Tarleton & Mary Robinson, 1957 John Knight, The War at Saber Point: Banastre Tarleton and the British Legion, 2020 Richard S. Walling, “Death in the Bronx: The Stockbridge Indian Massacre,” AmericanRevolution.org. https://www.americanrevolution.org/ind3.php. Laurence M. Hauptman, “The Road to Kingsbridge: Daniel Nimham and the Stockbridge Indian Company in the American Revolution,” Magazine of Smithsonian’s National Museum of the American Indian, Vol. 18, No. 3, Fall 2017. https://www.americanindianmagazine.org/story/road-kingsbridge-daniel-nimham-and-stockbridge-indian-company-american-revolution. John Graves Simcoe, Simcoe’s Military Journal, 80-86. Robert S. Grumet, The Nimhams of the Colonial Hudson Valley, 1667- 1783, Hudson Valley Regional Review (September 1992), 9.2. Information obtained from an email interview conducted by Michael Carter. M.A. requesting information on my behalf from the Kingsbridge Historical Society President Nick Dembrowski. Johann von Ewald, Diary of the American War: A Hessian Jorunal, trans. Joseph P. Tustin (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1979), 145-148. |
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Scarlet Ingstad
I am an independent author and historian seeking to uplift the stories of the lesser-known heroes and heroines of the American Revolution, alongside modern-day heroes and heroines who have served in the U.S. military and continue their service through their historical work. Archives
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