America Untold:
Forgotten heroes, Forgotten Stories
Scarlet Ingstad
Christian, Independent Author, Historian
Christian, Independent Author, Historian
Welcome back to my 14-part series on the life of Banastre Tarleton during the American Revolution! If you missed earlier installments, click the links below and read those chapters first. 1. Meet the Tarleton Family 2. Road to Revolution 3. "I'll Cut off General Lee's Head!" 4. Theater in Theatre 5. Legion Rising 6. Equine Design The success of the Kingsbridge attack provides a clear demonstration of the need for effective light infantry and dragoon units. However, the British had few and far between of these particular and unique troops. The reason for the lack of such units? There was no need for them. Britain is a small country, so there was no true need for light infantry and dragoon units. However, the open-plains of America demonstrated a need for these particular troops. Prior to the American Revolution, there Lord North had three regiments of Household Calvary, seven regiments of Dragoon Guards, and six regiments of the Light Dragoons stationed both home and abroad. Of these units only the 16th and 17th Light Dragoons were dispatched to America, and only the 17th Light Dragoon unit would remain for the duration of the war. Training these units was an expensive endeavor, one Britain was reluctant to finance. However, after the defeats at Brandywine and Long Island, the need to train and raise these units became more than evidence. British Loyalists possessed a greater understanding of the American terrain and often advised British commanders that cavalry units were preferred over foot units. The Georgia governor, Sir James Wright, wrote to Cornwallis, imploring him to send dragoon units. In his words, “150 to 200 horse will have a better effect in the Province than 600 foot.” However, the British Treasury refused to provide the funds. British Commanders were instructed to create their own Loyalist militias and utilize those to enforce law and order in the colonies. Cornwallis commented on Wright’s request to another officer, stating that “he must embody some Militia,” and that the cost of doing so could not come from “the Military Chest which is not capable of answering too violent demands.” The lack of cavalry was a strategic failing on the part of the British, but for Tarleton himself, it was an opportunity to shine. The British commanders continued augmenting the British Legion instead of recruiting new cavalry units. Tarleton was left with few rivals to contend with and stood out among his peers as a result. The longer the war dragged out, the more and more the British commanders relied on Tarleton and his Legion—and Tarleton was not a man to miss a chance to excel. He latched onto the opportunity and pushed himself and his men regularly, eager to achieve fame and success as quickly as possible. Tarleton was mostly left to his own devices when it came to training his men and choosing his fighting methods. His natural lack of patience combined with his informal demeanor later resulted in the creation of a guerilla-style warfare that became a mainstay in the southern theater. Although Tarleton can be described as rather vain, he was not a domineering commander. He was much more concerned with the end results than he was the way they were achieved. While many other British officials and officers focused on following certain regiments, form, and ritual, Tarleton had no qualms about adapting his methods whenever necessary. This even included the style of the uniforms he outfitted his Legion with. Tarleton soon found out that the southern regions of the colonies were incredibly hot and muggy during the summers. He started marching his troops during the evenings and had them remove their tight woolen jackets so that they were only wearing loose, white linen shirts. They started doing this so often that Simcoe even gave them a nickname, the “White Horse.” While other Loyalist units began transitioning to redcoats in 1778 through 1779, the British Legion remained in their green uniforms. The only other unit to do this was Simcoe’s Rangers. As time went on, the British Legion also adopted the nickname “Green Horse.” A Hessian officer provided a description of the British Legion uniforms, stating they wore “Short Round Green Tight Jacketts (sic), Black Collar and Cuffs.” It is likely that both the cavalry and infantry units wore the leather dragoon helmets as well. The most important part of the British Legion was of course the horse. And Tarleton himself was a man who appreciated and thoroughly understood the need for good horses. Robert Bass’ book about Tarleton begins with a particularly interesting story involving a wild black stallion and our young, intrepid dragoon. According to Bass, a young Tory stated: “I have witnessed many stirring scenes, both during the Revolution and since, but I never saw one half so exciting as the one between that savage man and that savage horse!” The man said Tarleton had been told about an unmanageable horse that was magnificent in stature and breed. The description alone excited Banastre and he purchased the animal outright, claiming he would be the one to break the horse in. “The mad brute will be the death of him,” the Tory stated, watching with trepidation as the horse was brought before Tarleton. He watched as Tarleton waited until everyone’s eyes were upon him, and then he mounted the horse, calling for his men to let the animal loose. Tarleton reportedly rode the horse, despite its dramatic attempts to throw him off, and, through use of the spur and a whip, eventually managed to subdue the animal. Tarleton dismounted and walked away, the horse following “him around like a dog.” The bloodied and sweaty horse, and very-pale-Tarleton, left the area to recover from their ordeal. Whether or not the account of Tarleton taming a wild horse is true, it was clear through his strict regimen of training and caring for the horses that the dragoon considered the horse to be the most important aspect of the British Legion. Written into their schedules were times to tend to their horses’ needs, rest them, and repair any riding equipment that may have been damaged. The standing orders for dragoons as of 1782 provided strict instructions regarding horse-care, including cleaning out the stalls, sweeping stables, providing adequate water and food, sufficient hay, and proper brushing techniques. All of these duties were to be carried out before a soldier was permitted to take his own breakfast. The care of the horse was the center of every cavalry officer’s day. While the standing orders themselves read as rather micromanaging or pedantic, the success of the dragoons’ operations, and even their own lives, depended on their horses. And Tarleton made sure that each and every horse was seen to properly by its rider. The horse-care schedule also ensured that both horse and rider were always prepared and in good physical condition. Perhaps even more important, the routines established a bond between rider and horse, a vital aspect when in the middle of a chaotic battle. A former British Legion officer once wrote that, “we had no sore backs; for a blanket, six or eight times doubled, was always laid on the horse’s back, under the saddle…The best captain of cavalry, I know, is not he who only fights his troop well in action; but he who has his horses in the best condition, and has the fewest sore backs in his troop.” The British Legion is famously known for their use of the saber, but this was not always the case with light dragoon units prior to the American Revolution. In Europe, light dragoon forces typically used a carbine that was capable of being fitted with a bayonet, and their officers were trained on how to shoot from the saddle. However, Tarleton believed that such weaponry actually made a cavalry unit less-effective. They were incredibly inaccurate, especially when on the back of a horse at full-gallop. In order to use the weapon effectively, an officer would be forced to bring his horse to a halt, aim, and then fire, wasting precious time and endangering both himself and the horse. This would also diminish the shock value, a major strategic advantage of light dragoon units. The British Legion in particular carried various pistols, but there is no record of the Legion getting involved in a static gunfight. Tarleton chose to, instead, believe that the saber provided the accuracy, speed, and efficiency that his unit needed to successfully carry out their missions. The British Legion’s offensive might come from their speed rather than the weapon. The horses Tarleton used for his unit would have weighed approximately eight to nine hundred pounds, along with a man atop, this created an approximately one-thousand-pound, fast-moving projectile. It became a staple of the Legion’s fighting techniques to “charge home,” turning their horses to the enemy with their swords in hand, and ride as fast as possible. The shock of horses charging at full-speed would create utter chaos, confusing and startling the enemy. In the malay, the cavalry officers would use their sabers to hack away at the enemy soldiers. Tarleton’s primary tactic soon became breaking his enemy by charging through their lines in this manner, then get his enemy on the run. Once on the run, they had their backs to his unit, making them significantly more vulnerable to their sabers. This became their trademark maneuver, and the fodder for many stories and folklore that would follow the Legion long after the American Revolution came to an end. Banastre Tarleton, alongside Simcoe, Rawdon, and Patrick Ferguson, redefined and transformed the character of the provincial corps. They would no longer work directly under the main army. Instead, under the leadership and guidance of these four young men, they would operate as effective and formidable, independent units. Traditional cavalry roles such as intelligence and supply gathering would no longer be their primary focus. Instead, the British Legion and their sister-units became essential to the war in the southern theater, able to track down the elusive American militia units and guerilla warfare techniques, a feat the main contingent of the British Army could not have accomplished at the time. In fact, the British Legion became too-heavily relied upon as the only unit capable of acting as an effective counterinsurgency weapon, a factor that would later play a part in determining the victor of the American Revolution. Sources Robert Bass, The Green Dragoon: The Lives of Banastre Tarleton & Mary Robinson, 1957 John Knight, The War at Saber Point: Banastre Tarleton and the British Legion, 2020 Governor Sir James Wright to Sir Henry Clinton, April 6, 1780, Report on American Manuscripts in the Royal Institution of Great Britain (London: H.M. Stationary off. by Mackie), 1:111 Cornwallis to Lt. Colonel Alured Clarke, Charlestown, PRO 30/55/24/ff. 16-17, TNA Earnest Sanger, Englishmen at War: A Social History in Letters 1450-1900 (Portland, ME: Sutton, 1993): 183 Anthony J Scotti, Brutal Virtue: The Myth and Reality of Banastre Tarleton, 2019 John Graves Simcoe, Simcoe’s Military Journal: A History of the Operations of a Partisan Corps Called the Queen’s Rangers, Commanded by Lieut. Col. J.G. Simcoe, During the War of the Revolution (New York: Bartlett & Welford, 1844), 209-210 The Dragoon Standing Orders of 1782 George Hanger, Colonel George Hanger, to All Sportsmen (London: printed for George Hanger, 1814), 123-124. Banastre Tarleton, A History of the Campaigns of 1780 and 1781 in the Southern Provinces of North America (London: T. Cadell, 1787), 18.
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Scarlet Ingstad
I am an independent author and historian seeking to uplift the stories of the lesser-known heroes and heroines of the American Revolution, alongside modern-day heroes and heroines who have served in the U.S. military and continue their service through their historical work. Archives
March 2022
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